Unilever & fish stock conservation
So long, and thanks for all the fish?
Fisheries in Europe are regulated by the Common Fisheries Policy. The Policy has two objectives: firstly, to fairly allocate which country can catch which fish; secondly, to set a limit on the total number of fish that can be caught in European waters.
The second objective doesn’t work.
This is because of the relatively simple political law of concentrated versus diffuse interest. It is in the interests of fishermen to catch as many fish as possible, this year. It is in the interests of all us that a large number of fish are not caught this year in order to ensure the longer-term sustainability of fish. But our interest is less acute than that of the fishermen. When the fisheries ministers of European countries sit down to debate the year’s fishing quotas, they know that fishermen are a powerful lobby that can cause them trouble. Because of the geographic concentration of fishermen, in any country with an election system based on geographic constituencies, the Minister’s party could lose a meaningful number of seats at the next election.
The result is that every year in Europe, too many fish are caught. (We are currently in a period where for a number of fish types, the numbers allowed to be caught each year is being reduced, but still not by enough because of the politics above).
In the 1990’s, this problem was becoming acute for cod in the North Sea. Greenpeace decided that this required a major campaign.
Greenpeace, being a politically sophisticated organization, realized the problem above, that it was difficult to attack the regulators (even though this was their responsibility), because the regulators were more frightened of fishermen than any other constituency. In such situations, it is also difficult to attack individual national governments, because they in turn blame other governments and ‘Brussels’. And it is difficult to attack ‘Brussels’ because there is such a tenuous link between Brussels and media that changes public opinion.
So Greenpeace needed another target, and looked towards what was becoming an increasingly common target – brands.
At the time, the largest single buyer of fish in the world was Unilever. Unilever owned the major frozen fish businesses Birdseye Walls, Langlese Iglo and Gorton’s in the US. Additionally, Unilever was a major purchaser of fish oil sourced from smaller fish for the production of its margarines.
In early 1996, therefore, Greenpeace started planning a campaign against Unilever in Europe, in order to highlight the unsustainable nature of European fisheries.
When Unilever became aware of the impending campaign, the company faced a strategic option. It could prepare to defend itself in communications terms on the basis of the status quo, by arguing (correctly) that it was not responsible for the problem being highlighted. This would have been the corporate reaction in 99% of cases.
Or it could choose to engage on the issue, which it did.
Unilever recognized two important points. One, that although the problem was not the company’s fault, it would be possible for opponents to connect the problem to the company’s brand over an extended period of time. Two, the politics of the Common Fisheries Policy above meant that it was at least possible that any problem with European fisheries would get far worse before the correct regulatory action was taken, and that this could become a major issue for media criticism.
Unilever therefore chose, rather than forever being associated with the problem, to be part of the solution.
The behaviour of business can be changed in two ways. The first is regulation, which in this case was not working. The second is a market-based mechanism.
Unilever engaged in a dialogue with the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF). WWF had successfully established a market-based mechanism in the forestry sector, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). What Unilever and WWF now planned was a Marine Stewardship Council – the MSC.
The MSC was to be set up as an independent organization whose role was to certify sustainable fisheries. Any fishery around the world could apply to be examined by the MSC, and if it were successfully certified as sustainable, any fish sold from that fishery could be labeled as MSC-certified.
The MSC was launched and is today certifying fisheries from around the world. The on-pack logo of ‘MSC certified’ is slowly gaining market awareness, which will encourage the supply chain to move towards wider certification. In addition to the CFP, there is a further mechanism in place in Europe to encourage the fishing supply chain to maintain sustainable fisheries.
What did all this mean for Unilever? Greenpeace did not campaign against the company, so a threat was avoided. Rather, Unilever was applauded for its action in playing a meaningful role in sustainability. Unilever’s market position and brand, which had briefly threatened to be its weakness on the issue, were instead used by the company to good effect: within weeks of its announcement, most of its competitors and most of the retailers in the UK had signified they would only source MSC-certified fish in the future. (Most of the largest retailers globally have now made this pledge). So over time, MSC labels would become a marketing requirement; in the meantime an MSC label could be seen as part of a premium brand promise (and price). And Unilever helped its business in a more fundamental way – Unilever’s future fish business depended on there being a sustainable supply of fish.
